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Abstract
The member states of the European Union received 1.2 million first time asylum applications in 2015
(a doubling compared to 2014). Even if asylum will be granted for many of the refugees that made
the journey to Europe, several obstacles for successful integration remain. This paper focuses on
one of these obstacles, namely the problem of finding housing for refugees once they have been
granted asylum. In particular, the focus is restricted to the situation in Sweden during 2015–2016
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1 Introduction
The European refugee crisis began in 2015 when a rising number of refugees made the journey
to Europe to seek asylum. The member states of the European Union received 1.2 million first
time asylum applications (more than a doubling compared to 2014).1 Apart from the Dublin
Regulation, which dictates that the member state in which an asylum seeker enters first is obliged
to render asylum, there has been no systematic way to divide refugees between the member
states. Obviously, this puts great pressure on member states located at the external border of the
European Union, and more specifically, on Greece, Hungary and Italy.
In an attempt to reduce pressure on the three member states mentioned above, the European
Commission decided in September 2015 on a temporary European relocation scheme for 120,000
refugees who are in need of international protection.2 The relocation scheme was based on a
distribution key, adopted by the European Commission in May 2015, where a specific quota was
stated for each member state based on:
“... objective, quantifiable and verifiable criteria that reflect the capacity of the mem-
ber states to absorb and integrate refugees, with appropriate weighting factors re-
flecting the relative importance of such criteria”.3
The distribution key, however, did not specify which refugees should be relocated to which mem-
ber states. This specific problem has attracted interest among researchers and more systematic
ways to relocate refugees between member states have been proposed. For example, Jones and
Teytelboym (2016a) propose a system where member states and refugees submit their prefer-
ences about which refugees they most wish to host and which state they most wish to be hosted
by, respectively, to a centralized clearing house which matches member states and refugees ac-
cording to these preferences.
Even if membership quotas are settled and a centralized matching relocation system is in
place, several obstacles for successful integration remain. This paper focuses on one of these
obstacles, namely the problem of finding housing for refugees once they have been relocated to a
European Union membership state, and, in particular, how market design can play an important
role in the solution to the problem. The background to the housing problem will be described
from the perspective of the situation in Sweden during 2015–2016.
In 2015, the population of Sweden was 9.9 million which accounts for about 1.4 percent of
the population in Europe. Yet, 12.4 percent of the asylum seekers in the European Union in
2015 were registered in Sweden which made Sweden the state in the European Union with most
asylum seekers per capita.4 A refugee who enters Sweden is temporarily placed at a Migration
1Eurostat News, Release 44/2016, March 4, 2016.
2Eurpoean Commission, Statement 15/5697, September 22, 2015.
3European Commission, “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions”, Annex, May 13, 2015.
4Eurostat News, Release 44/2016, March 4, 2016.
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Board accommodation facility in anticipation of either a deportation order or a permanent resi-
dence permit. The average waiting time for this decision was 15 months in May 2016.5 Refugees
who are granted permanent residence permits are, under Swedish law, entitled to a number of es-
tablishment measures, and their legal status is upgraded from “asylum seekers” to “refugees with
a permanent residence permit”.6 These establishments measures include, e.g., accommodation,
Swedish language courses, and a monthly allowance. An establishment plan is formally estab-
lished and coordinated between the refugee and the Swedish Employment Service. The local
municipality where the refugee is registered has the responsibility to find appropriate accommo-
dation. In this process, the refugee must leave the Migration Board accommodation facility since
the legal responsibility for the refugee is transferred from the state to the local municipality.
One problem in Sweden is that almost all accommodation options are exhausted. In March
2015, it was estimated that 9,300 persons with a permanent residence permit still lived in an
Migration Board accommodation facility and that, at least, 14,100 residential units were needed
before the end of 2016 just to accommodate those who are granted a residence permit.7 This
estimation was updated in February 2016 to at least 20,000 new residential units only in the
spring of 2016 provided that there is no drastic increase in the number of asylum seekers.8 These
facts, together with a new legislation, effective from March 1, 2016, stating that all municipalities
have to accept refugees puts even more pressure on municipalities to find additional residential
units. This has forced some municipalities to consider extraordinary actions. One example is
the passenger ship Ocean Gala leased for use as an asylum accommodation with room for nearly
800 people in Utansjö port outside the city Härnösand in the north east of Sweden.9 Another
example is a temporary tent camp with a capacity to accommodate 1,520 asylum seekers that
was scheduled to open in December 2015 on Revingehed armor training ground 20 kilometers
east of the city of Lund in the south of Sweden.10 Hence, it is urgent to find residential units for
refugees, not only because they are entitled to it under Swedish law, but also because they are
blocking asylum seekers from accommodation at Migration Board accommodation facilities.
A key observation, and a possible solution to the above described problem, can be found in
a report from “The Swedish National Board of Housing, Building and Planning” in 2013, where
it is estimated that 90 percent of the general housing shortage in Sweden can be explained by
inefficient use of the existing housing stock.11 More precisely, due to rent control, tenants tend
5Swedish Migration Board, www.migrationsverket.se/Kontakta-oss/Tid-till-beslut.html, May 13, 2016.
6The Swedish terminology for “refugees with a permanent residence permit” is “nyanländ” but we will, for con-
venience, in the remaining part of this paper, slightly abuse the translation of the Swedish word and use “refugees”
instead of the correct terminology “refugees with a permanent residence permit”.
7“Nyanländas boendesituation – delrapport”, The Swedish National Board of Housing, Building and Planning,
Rapport 2015:10.
8“More than 20 000 new places needed in accommodation in the spring”, Swedish Migration Board, February
19, 2016.
9“Migrationsverket visste inte att miljonbåten var på väg”, June 15, 2016, SVT.
10“Första asylsökande har flyttat in i tältlägret i Revinge”, December 10, 2015, Aftonbladet.
11“Bostadsbristen och hyressättningssystemet – ett kunskapsunderlag”, Marknadsrapport, The Swedish National
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to live in apartments which are too big for their circumstances.
In a recent survey, 31 percent of the Swedish households stated that they are willing to ac-
commodate refugees in their homes.12 Of course, a stated willingness to accommodate a refugee
and actually accommodating a refugee are two different things, and it should also be noted that
the general view on refugees in Sweden was not as positive in the spring of 2016 as it was in the
fall of 2015.13 However, there were 4,766,000 households in Sweden in January 201514, and if
only 1 percent of the households (instead of 30 percent) are willing to accommodate a refugee,
there are still 47,660 households that are willing to host refugees. Hence, to release the pressure
on municipalities to find housing for refugees, voluntarily supplied private housing can be uti-
lized.15 In this way, beds that are occupied by refugees with a permanent residence permit at the
Migration Board accommodation facilities can be used for asylum seekers.
In several meetings at various levels in the Swedish administration, e.g., with the State Sec-
retary to the Minister of Housing and the Swedish Migration Board, the authors of this paper
presented a version of the theoretical matching model described in this paper. The model con-
tains a set of “landlords” (i.e., private persons) with capacity and willingness to accommodate
refugees in their private homes and a set of refugee families with permanent residence permits.
In the model, a refugee family and a landlord find each other mutually acceptable if they have a
spoken language in common and if the number of family members does not exceed the capacity
of the landlord. The communication requirement is key and its importance has been stressed
by politicians in, e.g., the above mentioned meetings, and it is a requirement in, e.g., the non-
centralized system adopted by the European NGO “Refugees Welcome” to match refugees with
private persons.
Even if it is natural to assume that landlords have preferences over refugee families, it is
not unreasonable to believe that it is difficult for landlords to provide a strict ranking of all
refugee families. There are several reasons for this.16 For example, there are thousands of refugee
families in the system and it is probably difficult to gather complete information about all these
families and even if such information is available it is not clear how to process it. For this reason,
it is, throughout the paper, assumed that landlords only report their spoken languages and their
capacity (i.e., the number of available beds).
Board of Housing, Building and Planning, 2013.
12“Svenska folkets attityder till flyktingar”, September 24, 2015, DN/Ipsos.
13“Allmänhetens uppfattning om invandringen”, March 25, 2016, Demoskop.
14“Antal hushåll i Sverige”, 2016, Statistics Sweden.
15In fact, many Swedish municipalities are today actively searching for private persons that are willing to
accommodate refugees in their private homes and private persons and refugee families are matched in a non-
centralized way. Examples of such municipalities include Stockholms stad, Lunds kommun, Ängleholms kom-
mun, Nynäshamns kommun, Kristianstads kommun, Nacka kommun, Botkyrka kommun, Håbo kommun, Härryda
kommun, and Lerums kommun.
16See Jones et al. (2016) or Jones and Teytelboym (2016a,b) for a discussion about ranking and preferences for
local authorities and refugees in a refugee matching context.
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Given these reports and three very natural assumptions, it is possible to induce preferences for
landlords over refugee families. More specifically, it will be assumed that matched landlords and
refugee families must find each other acceptable (in terms of spoken languages and capacities),
that private landlords can accommodate at most one refugee family, and that landlords strictly
prefer a larger refugee family to a smaller as long as they both are acceptable. Given these
assumptions, preferences for landlords can be induced and landlords classify refugee families to
belong to different indifference classes. Landlords are indifferent between any two families in
the same indifference class, but have strict (induced) preferences over the indifference classes.
Naturally, refugees are also allowed to have preferences over landlords but for the same
reasons as above, refugees only report their spoken languages and family size. Based on these
reports, it is, again, possible to induce preferences where landlords are classified to be either
acceptable or unacceptable.
Given the induced preferences for landlords and refugee families, the idea in this paper is to
find a formal procedure for identifying a matching, i.e., a procedure describing which refugees
are assigned to which landlords for the given preferences. Because a matching not necessar-
ily is unique, the attention is directed towards matchings with specific properties. Given the
acute shortage of residential units in Sweden, a natural requirement on a matching is that it is
maximum, i.e., that a maximum number of refugees are matched to (acceptable) landlords or,
equivalently, that a maximum number of privately supplied beds are utilized. A second require-
ment is stability. Given the induced preferences considered in this paper, this axiom means that
no refugee family strictly prefers some landlord to being unmatched when, at the same time, that
specific landlord strictly prefers that refugee family to his current match. This also means that
stability, in this setting, guarantees a lower welfare bound for the participating private landlords
as the landlords can be made assure that if they are matched to some refugee family, there is at
least no unmatched refugee family that they strictly prefer to their current match. It is also well-
known that unstable mechanisms tend to die out while stable mechanisms survive the test of time
(Roth, 2008). The main innovation in this paper is the construction of an algorithm, called the
Maximality-Improvement-Chains algorithm. This algorithm identifies a stable maximum match-
ing for any given refugee assignment problem.
This paper is related to several strands of matching and market design literature.17 The basic
model is a two-sided matching model with capacities, like, e.g., Abdulkadirog˘lu and Sönmez
(2003), Abdulkadirog˘lu et al. (2009), Balinski and Sönmez (1999) and Gale and Shapley (1962),
where the number of offered beds and the number of needed beds are the capacities of the land-
lords and the refugee families, respectively. It is, however, not a many-to-many matching model,
like, e.g., Echenique and Oviedo (2006) and Konishi and Ünver (2006), because even though
landlords offer several beds and refugee families may need multiple beds, agents are matched to
at most one agent from the other side of the market, i.e., refugee families are matched to at most
17For an overview of the matching and market design literature see, e.g., Roth and Sotomayor (1990) or Sönmez
and Ünver (2011).
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one landlord and landlords are matched to at most one refugee family.
Furthermore, in contrast to most papers in the two-sided matching literature, this paper is
not primarily concerned with stable matchings as the focus instead is directed towards maximum
matchings. The first result also states that a maximum matching not necessarily is stable and that
a stable matching is not necessarily maximum. However, as we demonstrate, there always exists
a maximum matching which in addition is stable. Consequently, even if maximum matchings
are central in the analysis, maximality can be achieved without dispensing stability. As already
described in the above, stable maximum matchings can be identified by adopting the Maximality-
Improvement-Chains algorithm. The main building block in this algorithm is the “execution”
of specific “chains of refugees”. These executions always strictly increase the cardinality of
the matching while maintaining stability. This also means that the model investigated in this
paper is located in between school choice with indifferences (Erdil and Ergin, 2008) where a
stable-improvement-cycles algorithm is proposed in order to find a stable matching which is not
Pareto dominated by another stable matching, and the kidney exchange framework (Roth et al.,
2004) where certain trading cycles and chains are executed in order to increase the number of
transplanted kidneys.
Even if a variety of problems have been investigated in different market design contexts18,
almost no attention has been directed towards problems related to refugee matching. There are,
however, a few exceptions. As already mentioned in the above, Jones and Teytelboym (2016a)
propose a partial solution to the European refugee crisis via the construction of a two-sided
matching system that assigns refugees to member states of the European Union. More related
to this paper is Delacretaz et al. (2016) and Jones and Teytelboym (2016b). Both these papers
consider the local refugee matching problem, i.e., the problem of finding out where in a country
that refugees should be settled once they have been granted protection. Jones and Teytelboym
(2016b) describe in general terms how a two-sided matching system can be constructed when
assigning refugees to localities. They also outline in detail how this system can be applied
in order to meet the British government’s commitment to resettle 20,000 Syrian refugees by
2020. Delacretaz et al. (2016), on the other hand, consider a two-sided matching market for the
local refugee match and propose three different refugee resettlement systems that can be used
by hosting countries under different circumstances. The common idea in these three systems
is to improve match efficiency and to reduce internal movement of refugees across localities.
However, none of the matching systems considered in the above three mentioned papers focuses
on stable maximum matchings. Neither do they consider matching mechanisms based on the
execution of specific chains of refugees as the one proposed in this paper. Instead, they consider
versions of the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm (Gale and Shapley, 1962) and the Top Trading
Cycles Algorithm (Shapley and Scarf, 1974).
18Examples include, e.g., school choice (Balinski and Sönmez, 1999; Abdulkadirog˘lu and Sönmez, 2003), entry-
level job market for doctors (Roth and Peranson, 1999), kidney exchange (Roth et al., 2004), course allocation
(Budish and Cantillon, 2012), and cadet-branch matching (Sönmez and Switzer, 2013; Sönmez, 2013).
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The remaining part of the paper is outlined as follows. Section 2 introduces the refugee
assignment problem and the basic ingredients of the matching model. A number of results related
to stable maximum matchings are presented in Section 3. The Maximality-Improvement-Chains
algorithm is introduced and analyzed in Section 4. Results related to manipulability and strategy-
proofness are stated in Section 5. Some concluding remarks are provided in Section 6. All proofs
are relegated to the Appendix.
2 The Model and Basic Definitions
This section starts by presenting the basic ingredients of the refugee assignment problem. Once
this problem has been introduced, the preferences of the landlords and refugees can be induced
given three very natural assumptions. The section ends by describing the concept of a matching
and by stating some desirable properties of matchings for the refugee assignment problem.
2.1 The Refugee Assignment Problem
Each refugee family contains a number of family members that wish to be accommodated by a
landlord. Landlords are private persons that voluntarily supply parts of their homes to refugee
families. Exactly how many refugees a landlord can accommodate is determined by his capacity.
Landlords speak at least one language and have strict preferences over the languages they speak.
Refugees speak exactly one language (see Appendix A for an extension to the case with multiple
languages). Formally, a refugee assignment problem consists of:
• A set of refugee families I = {1, . . . , |I|},
• a set of landlords C = {c1, . . . , c|C|},
• a vector qI = (q1, . . . , q|I|) specifying the size qi of each refugee family i,
• a vector qC = (qc1 , . . . , qc|C|) specifying the capacity qc of each landlord c,
• a set L specifying the languages spoken by the refugee families and the landlords,
• a vector (l(1), . . . , l(|I|)) stating the spoken language l(i) for each refugee family i,
• a list of strict preferences = (c1 , . . . ,c|C|) specifying the strict preference c over
L ∪ {c} for each landlord c.
It will sometimes be convenient not to separate refugees from landlords. In this case, we refer to
an agent v who belongs to the set V = C ∪ I . For convenience, the term “refugee” is often used
instead of “refugee family” and it is then understood that the refugee is part of a refugee family
with a specific number of family members. Moreover, the expression “capacity of refugee i” will
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often be used to indicate the number of family members in refugee family i. It is also, without
loss of generality, assumed that the capacity of the landlord with maximal capacity equals the
number of family members of the refugee family with maximal number of family members, i.e.,
maxc∈C qc = maxi∈I qi.19
For later purposes, the following notation will be important for keeping track of landlords
and refugees with specific capacities:
• Ck = {c ∈ C : qc = k} is the set of landlords with capacity k,
• Ik = {i ∈ I : qi = k} is the set of refugee families with k family members,
• Il = {i ∈ I : l(i) = l} is the set of refugees speaking language l,
• Ikl = Ik ∩ Il is the set of refugee families speaking language l with k family members.
All refugees with at least k family members and all landlords with at least capacity k are gathered
in the sets I≥k = ∪nj=kIj and C≥k = ∪nj=kCj , respectively.
2.2 Induced Preferences
The notion of acceptable languages and agents are introduced next. Given this notion and three
maintained assumptions, the preferences of the refugees and the landlords can be induced from
the given refugee assignment problem.
Language l is acceptable for landlord c if l c c. The set of acceptable languages for landlord
c is denoted by A(c). Both language and capacity constraints play an important role in deter-
mining which refugees are acceptable for landlords and vice versa. More precisely, a refugee i
is acceptable for landlord c if and only if refugee i speaks a language which is acceptable for
landlord c and the capacity (or size) of refugee i does not exceed the capacity of landlord c, i.e.,
if and only if l(i) ∈ A(c) and qi ≤ qc. By symmetry, landlord c is acceptable for refugee i if
and only if refugee i is acceptable for landlord c. An agent that is not acceptable is unacceptable.
The following three assumptions will be maintained in the remaining part of this paper.
Assumption 1. Landlords can accommodate at most one refugee family and if a landlord ac-
commodates a refugee family, then the landlord has to accommodate all members of the family.
Assumption 2. Landlords can only accommodate acceptable refugee families and refugee fam-
ilies can only be accommodated by acceptable landlords.
19Otherwise, either qj = maxi∈I qi > maxc∈C qc or maxi∈I qi < maxc∈C qc = qc′ . In the first case, refugee j
can never be assigned to any landlord, i.e., refugee j may be removed from the problem. For the second case, note
that because only one refugee family can be assigned to landlord c′ (see Assumption 1), the capacity of landlord c′
may, without loss of generality, be set equal to maxi∈I qi.
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Assumption 3. Landlords strictly prefer a larger refugee family to a smaller refugee family if
both refugee families are acceptable.
The assumptions reflect that landlords should be seen as private persons that voluntarily supply
parts of their homes to refugee families. It is then natural to assume that landlords are willing to
accommodate at most one refugee family and that local authorities don’t allow landlords to ac-
commodate more than one family (there may be legal as well as tax reasons for this). Moreover,
it is natural that landlords are able to communicate with the refugee families they accommodate
and, from a humanitarian perspective, that refugee families are kept intact. Furthermore, if land-
lords receive a monetary compensation for accommodating refugee families that, in addition,
depends on the size of the refugee family, it is natural that larger refugee families are preferred to
smaller (such compensations are paid out by the local authorities to the private landlords in most
of the municipalities mentioned in Footnote 15).
Given the notion of acceptability and the above three assumptions, it is possible to derive an
induced preference profile R for the agents in V . Let Rc denote the induced preference relation
Rc for landlord c over the set I ∪ {c}. Let also Pc and Ic denote the strict and the indifference
part of the preference relation Rc, respectively. The induced preference relation Rc for landlord
c is described by:
• cPci if and only if refugee i is unacceptable,
• iPcc if and only if refugee i is acceptable,
• iPcj if refugees i, j ∈ I are acceptable and qi > qj ,
• iPcj if refugees i, j ∈ I are acceptable, qi = qj and l(i) c l(j),
• iIcj if refugees i, j ∈ I are acceptable, qi = qj and l(i) = l(j).
Similarly as above, let Ri denote the induced preference relation Ri for refugee i over the set
C ∪ {i}, and let Pi and Ii denote its strict and indifference relations, respectively. The induced
preference relation Ri for refugee i is described by:
• iPic if and only if landlord c is unacceptable,
• cPii if and only if landlord c is acceptable,
• cIic′ if landlords c, c′ ∈ C are acceptable.
Let R = (Rv)v∈V denote the induced (preference) profile for the agents in V . The set of all such
profiles is denoted by PV . A profile R ∈ PV may also be written as (Rv, R−v) when the pref-
erence relation Rv of agent v is of particular importance. The following example demonstrates
how preferences can be induced from the refugee assignment problem.
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Example 1. Let C = {c1, c2, c3, c4, c5}, I = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, qc1 = qc2 = qc3 = qc4 = 2,
qc5 = 1, q1 = q2 = q3 = 2, q4 = q5 = q6 = 1, and L = {s1, s2, s3, s4, s5, s6}. Suppose further
that l(i) = si for all i ∈ I , i.e., all refugees speak different languages. Let the strict preferences
over acceptable languages for the landlords be given by:
s1 c1 s3 c1 c1,
s2 c2 s4 c2 c2,
s1 c3 c3,
s5 c4 s2 c4 c4,
s5 c5 s6 c5 c5.
Then the induced preference profile R over acceptable matches is given by the table below. Note
that 2Pc45 since s2, s5 ∈ A(c4) and q2 > q5.
Rc1 Rc2 Rc3 Rc4 Rc5 R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6
1 2 1 2 5 c1, c3 c2, c4 c1 c2 c4, c5 c5
3 4 c3 5 6
c1 c2 c4 c5
2.3 Matchings and Properties of Matchings
Landlords (refugees) are either unmatched or matched to a refugee (to a landlord) under the
restriction that a landlord c ∈ C is matched to refugee i ∈ I if and only if refugee i is matched to
landlord c. Formally, a matching is a function µ : C ∪ I → C ∪ I such that µ(c) ∈ I ∪{c} for all
c ∈ C, µ(i) ∈ C ∪ {i} for all i ∈ I , and µ(c) = i if and only if µ(i) = c. Agent v is unmatched
at matching µ if µ(v) = v. Given a matching µ, the matched landlords and the matched refugees
are collected in the sets µ(C) ≡ {c ∈ C : µ(c) 6= c} and µ(I) ≡ {i ∈ I : µ(i) 6= i}, respectively.
A matching µ is feasible at profile R if µ(v)Rvv for all v ∈ V , i.e., if each agent is matched to
an acceptable agent or remains unmatched. Note that only feasible matchings are considered in
this paper by Assumption 2. The set of all matchings is denoted byM.
Let |µ| = ∑i∈µ(I) qi denote the cardinality of matching |µ|, i.e., the total number of matched
refugee family members at matching µ. A matching µ is maximum at profile R ∈ PV if there
exists no other feasible matching µ′ such that |µ′| > |µ|. A matching µ is stable at profile
R ∈ PV if it is feasible and there is no blocking pair, i.e., there exist no landlord-refugee pair
(c, i) such that iPcµ(c) and cPiµ(i). Note that given the induced preferences considered in this
paper, stability means that no refugee family strictly prefers some landlord to being unmatched
when, at the same time, that specific landlord strictly prefers that refugee family to his current
match. A stable maximum matching is a matching which is both stable and maximum.
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3 Properties of Stable Maximum Matchings
This section presents a number of results related to stable and maximum matchings. These
results are crucial in the construction of the Maximality-Improvement-Chains algorithm (called
the MIC-algorithm, henceforth). This algorithm will be presented in the next section and it can
be adopted in order to identify a stable maximum matching for any refugee assignment problem.
The first result demonstrates (using Example 1) that a stable matching is not necessarily
maximum and that a maximum matching is not necessarily stable.
Proposition 1. Let µ be a stable matching and let µ′ a maximum matching for some profile
R ∈ PV . Then µ is not necessarily a maximum matching and µ′ is not necessarily a stable
matching.
Proof of Proposition 1. Consider profile R from Example 1 and the following three matchings:
µ =
(
c1 c2 c3 c4 c5
3 2 1 c4 5
)
, µ′ =
(
c1 c2 c3 c4 c5
3 4 1 2 6
)
, µ′′ =
(
c1 c2 c3 c4 c5
3 4 1 2 5
)
.
The interpretation of matching µ is that landlord c1 is matched to refugee 3, landlord c2 is
matched to refugee 2, landlord c3 is matched to refugee 1, landlord c5 is matched to refugee
5, and landlord c4 as well as refugees 4 and 6 are unmatched. From the profile R, it is clear that
matching µ is a stable matching. It is, however, not maximum because matching µ′ is feasible
and has greater cardinality than µ, i.e., |µ′| = 8 > 7 = |µ|. Matching µ′, on the other hand, is
maximum but not stable. The latter conclusion follows because landlord c5 and refugee 5 form a
blocking pair. In the example, the unique stable maximum matching is given by µ′′. 
The next result establishes that a stable maximum matching exists for any profile R. The under-
lying reason is that preferences over languages are correlated in the following sense; if a landlord
finds a certain language acceptable, then the landlord is indifferent between any two refugee fam-
ilies of the same size that speak this language, and any two refugee families speaking the same
language are indifferent between any two acceptable landlords speaking their language.
Theorem 1. For any profile R ∈ PV , there exists a stable maximum matching.
Theorem 1 has the important consequence that one only needs to search in the set of stable
matchings to find a maximum matching. The general procedure for identifying a stable maximum
matching described in this paper (i.e., the MIC-algorithm) will therefore start with an arbitrary
stable matching. It is straightforward to find a stable matching for any profile R ∈ PV , e.g.,
by arbitrarily breaking ties in R in case it contains any indifference relations, and by applying
the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm (Gale and Shapley, 1962) to the resulting strict profile. The
key in the MIC-algorithm is to identify specific subsets of refugees and landlords that can be
rematched in such a way that the number of matched refugees increases while maintaining the
feasibility and stability properties. The next example illustrates this idea.
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Example 2. Consider a modification of Example 1 that contains only the agents in the sets
C2 = {c1, c2, c3, c4} and I2 = {1, 2, 3} with corresponding preferences. For this problem, it is
easy to check that the following matching is stable:
µ =
(
c1 c2 c3 c4
1 2 c3 c4
)
.
Note that refugee 3 is unmatched at µ and speaks language s3, language s3 is spoken by landlord
c1, landlord c1 is matched to refugee 1 at matching µ, refugee 1 speaks language s1, and landlord
c3 speaks language s1 and is unmatched at µ. This sequence of agents and languages can be
illustrated as follows:
3→ s3 → c1 → 1→ s1 → c3. (1)
Note that the sequence (1) contains only two refugees and by picking out these two refugees, the
chain 〈3, 1〉 is formed. The main idea in the MIC-algorithm is to identify such chains (for a given
stable but non-maximal matching) and “execute” them. The execution simply means that each
refugee in the chain (except the last) is rematched to the landlord that is matched to the refugee
that succeeds the refugee in the chain, and the last refugee in the chain is rematched to some
unmatched landlord. In this example, the execution implies that a new matching is obtained by
matching the unmatched refugee 3 to landlord c1 and by matching refugee 1 to the unmatched
landlord c3. Such an execution is possible because, as illustrated in the above sequence (1), all
rematched refugees have a language in common with the landlords that they are rematched to and
no capacity constraints are violated. Note, finally, that in this process, the number of matched
refugees increases while the feasibility and stability properties continue to hold. 
The insights from the above example can be generalized as revealed in the next theorem. More
precisely, if a stable matching µ is not maximal, then there must exist a shortest chain of refugees
〈i0, i1, . . . , im〉 that can be executed in such a way that the first refugee in the chain, who is un-
matched at µ, becomes matched to a landlord after the execution of the chain and the last refugee
in the chain (i) either becomes unmatched or (ii) rematched to a landlord that was unmatched at
µ. In both cases, the cardinality of the matching increases because, in the first case, the capacity
of the first refugee in the chain is strictly greater than the capacity of the last refugee in the chain
and, in the second case, all agents, who were matched before the execution of the chain, remain
matched after the execution.
Theorem 2. Let µ a stable matching for a given profile R ∈ PV . If µ is not a stable maximum
matching, then there exists a chain of refugees 〈i0, i1, . . . , im〉 such that µ(i0) = i0, µ(in) = cn
and in−1Pcncn for all n = 1, . . . ,m, and either:
(i) qim < qi0 ≤ qin for all n = 1, . . . ,m − 1, and cn′Pcn′ in for all n = 0, . . . ,m − 2 and all
n′ = n+ 2, . . . ,m; or
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(ii) qi0 ≤ qin for all n = 1, . . . ,m, imPcm+1cm+1 for some cm+1 ∈ C\µ(C), and cn′Pcn′ in for
all n = 0, . . . ,m− 2 and all n′ = n+ 2, . . . ,m.
4 The Maximality-Improvement-Chains Algorithm
This section describes the MIC-algorithm and demonstrates that it always identifies a stable max-
imum matching for any refugee assignment problem. In this algorithm, landlords and refugees
with maximal capacity are considered first, and then the landlords and refugees with the second
highest capacity, and so on. To separate landlords and refugees with different capacity from
each other, the refugee assignment problem will be divided into three generic subproblems de-
noted by Rn, Rn−k−1 and R≥n−k−1 where k = 0, . . . , n − 2. Because similar but different
notation and techniques are required for the different subproblems, the MIC-algorithm is next
stated in its generic form (even if the above mentioned subproblems not yet have been defined).
The subproblems are separately described in the following three subsections. This separation
of subproblems also enables a stepwise introduction of an example (based on Example 1) that
illustrates all features of the MIC-algorithm.
The Maximality-Improvement-Chains Algorithm. For any given profileR ∈ PV ,
consider problemRn and identify a stable maximum matching µn. For each iteration
k = 0, . . . , n− 2:
Step (i). Find a stable maximum matching µn−k−1 for problem Rn−k−1.
Step (ii). Find a stable maximum matching µ≥n−k−1 for problemR≥n−k−1 = R≥n−k∪
Rn−k−1.
If k = n− 2, terminate the process. Otherwise, set k := k + 1 and go to Step (i). 
The following result is the main result of the paper and it states that the MIC-algorithm always
identifies a stable maximum matching for any given refugee assignment problem. The proof
of the result follows directly from the results presented in the following three subsections and
the intuition is straightforward. More precisely, in the last step of the last iteration of the MIC-
algorithm, problem R≥1 is considered, and because all refugees and all landlords are included in
this problem, by definition, the identified stable maximum matching must be a stable maximum
matching for the given refugee assignment problem.
Theorem 3. For any given profile R ∈ PV , the Maximality-Improvement-Chains algorithm
identifies a stable maximum matching.
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4.1 ProblemRn: The Initialization of the MIC-algorithm
ProblemRn contains the refugees and the landlords with maximal capacity (i.e., the agents in the
set In∪Cn) and their preferences. As is clear from the description of the MIC-algorithm, a stable
maximum matching µn for problem Rn is required to initialize the algorithm. This subsection
describes how this matching can be identified given that a stable matching for problem Rn is
known.20 The general idea is, as explained in Example 2, to identify “chains of refugees” that
satisfy the requirements in the second part of Theorem 2 and “execute” these chains. As will be
demonstrated, this execution always generates a new matching with strictly increased cardinality
while maintaining the feasibility and stability properties and it will not leave any previously
matched agent unmatched. The process is then repeated for the new matching and after a finite
number of repetitions, a stable maximum matching µn for problem Rn is obtained.
The key in constructing the “chains of refugees” is to make sure that agents that are rematched
when a chain is “executed” are matched to agents that speak acceptable languages (because
all landlords and refugees have capacity n in this problem, the capacity constraints need not
be explicitly considered). To keep track of unmatched agents and their acceptable languages,
a specific graph, called the n-MIC-graph, will next be constructed using an iterative process.
To formalize the process, suppose that µ is a stable matching for problem Rn and let the set
L = {l(i) : i ∈ In \ µ(In)} contain the languages spoken by all unmatched refugees in the set
In at matching µ, and let the set L¯ = ∪c∈Cn\µ(Cn)A(c) contain the acceptable languages of all
unmatched landlords in the set Cn at matching µ. In the n-MIC-graph, the notation l′ → l is
used to describe a directed edge from l′ to l.
Construction of the n-MIC-graph for matching µ. Let the set of nodes be given
by the set of languages L. An edge is constructed as follows. Initialize L0 = L. For
each u := 0, 1, . . .:
Iteration u + 1. Given l′ ∈ ∪ur=0Lr and l ∈ L \ (∪ur=0Lr), there is a directed edge
from l′ to l if l′ ∈ ∪c∈Cn:l(µ(c))=lA(c). Define:
Lu+1 = {l ∈ L \ (∪ur=0Lr) : l′ → l for some l′ ∈ ∪ur=0Lr}.
If Lu+1 ∩ L¯ 6= ∅ or Lu+1 = ∅, terminate the process. Otherwise, set u := u+ 1 and
continue. 
Note that the set ∪c∈Cn:l(µ(c))=lA(c) contains all languages that are acceptable for the landlords
in Cn who are matched to a refugee speaking language l at matching µ. The following example
illustrates how an edge in the graph can be constructed.
20A stable matching for problem Rn can be identified using the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm (Gale and Shap-
ley, 1962) as already explained in Section 3.
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Example 3. This example, as well as all remaining examples of the paper, is based on Example
1 with the only modification that refugee 6 and, consequently, language s6 are deleted from the
problem. Because the maximal capacity of any agent equals two, problem Rn = R2 contains
the agents in the sets C2 = {c1, c2, c3, c4} and I2 = {1, 2, 3}. For this problem, matching
µ from Example 2 is stable. Note next that L = {s3} and L¯ = {s1, s2, s5}. Consequently,
L0 = L = {s3} and L \ L0 = {s1, s2, s4, s5}. The construction of an edge in the 2-MIC-graph
for matching µ now proceeds as follows:
Iteration 1. Consider the given language l′ = s3 ∈ L0, and note that there is a
directed edge from l′ = s3 ∈ L0 to l = s1 ∈ L \ L0, i.e., s3 → s1. This follows
because language s3 is acceptable for landlord c1 and landlord c1 is matched to a
refugee that speaks language s1 at matching µ. Consequently, L1 = {s1}.
Because L¯ = {s1, s2, s5}, it follows that L1 ∩ L¯ = {s1} 6= ∅ and the process terminates after
iteration 1. Hence, for the given stable matching µ, the edge s3 → s1 is identified in the 2-MIC-
graph. 
What may not be so obvious is that the construction of the n-MIC-graph is the backbone in the
process of identifying a stable maximum matching for problem Rn. To see this, note that a more
general description of an edge in the n-MIC-graph is a chain of length m from L to L¯ such that
l0 ∈ L, lm−1 ∈ L¯ and lu ∈ Lu for all u = 1, . . . ,m− 1, i.e.:
l0 → l1 → · · · → lm−1. (2)
As is demonstrated in the following proposition, the existence of this type of chain, in any stable
matching, means that the matching cannot be a stable maximum matching.
Proposition 2. Let µ be a stable matching for problem Rn and L∞ = ∪∞u=0Lu. Then the follow-
ing are equivalent for n-MIC-graph:
(a) µ is not a maximum matching for problem Rn.
(b) L∞ ∩ L¯ 6= ∅.
(c) There exists a chain l0 → l1 → · · · → lm−1 from L to L¯ such that l0 ∈ L, lm−1 ∈ L¯ and
lu ∈ Lu for all u = 1, . . . ,m− 1.
Proposition 2 reveals that matching µ from Example 2 cannot be a stable maximum matching
since L∞ ∩ L¯ = {s1} 6= ∅. However, this has already been pointed out in Example 2 but
the construction of the n-MIC-graph and Proposition 2 combined give a general procedure for
determining whether or not a stable matching in addition is maximum. Recall also from Example
2 that languages s1 and s3, identified in the sequence (1), enabled the “execution” of the chain of
refugees 〈3, 1〉 in the example. Because the construction of the n-MIC-graph is a general method
for identifying the relevant languages, the next step is to find a general process for constructing
and executing the relevant chains of refugees.
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Execution of a chain of lengthm from L to L¯ for problemRn. Consider a given
stable matching µ, a given problem Rn, and a given chain of type (2) of length m
from L to L¯ in the n-MIC-graph for matching µ. Choose i0 ∈ In \ µ(In) such that
l(i0) = l0. For each iteration u := 1, . . . ,m− 2:
Iteration u. Choose iu ∈ µ(In) such that l(iu) = lu and lu−1 ∈ A(µ(iu)).
Iteration m− 1. Choose cˆ ∈ Cn \ µ(Cn) such that lm−1 ∈ A(cˆ).
Matching µ′ is then obtained from matching µ as follows: µ′(iu) = µ(iu+1) for all
u = 0, . . . ,m− 2, µ′(im−1) = cˆ, and µ′(i) = µ(i) for all i ∈ In \ {i0, . . . , im−1}. 
The above process produces a chain of refugees of type 〈i0, . . . , im−1〉 and a new matching µ′
is obtained from the initial matching µ by executing the chain, i.e., each refugee in the chain
(except the last) is matched to the landlord which, at matching µ, is matched to the refugee that
succeeds the refugee in the chain, and the last refugee in the chain is matched to a landlord
which is unmatched at µ. Note also that as long as there is an edge in the n-MIC-graph, a chain
of type 〈i0, . . . , im−1〉 exists.21 Furthermore, the cardinality of the new matching µ′ is strictly
greater than the cardinality of the initial matching µ but the feasibility and stability properties are
maintained, and all refugees that are matched at µ are also matched at µ′. The latter conclusion
follows because µ′(In) = µ(In) ∪ {i0} by construction.
The above insights can be applied in the following way. Construct the n-MIC-graph for the
given stable matching µ and check whether L∞ ∩ L¯ 6= ∅. If L∞ ∩ L¯ = ∅, then by Proposition
2, µ is a stable maximum matching for the problem Rn, and the MIC-algorithm can continue to
iteration 0. If not, there exists a chain of type (2) and this chain can be executed to obtain a new
stable matching µ′ from the initial matching µ. Given matching µ′, the procedure is repeated and
because the cardinality of the matching strictly increases for each execution, a stable maximum
matching µn for problem Rn is obtained after a finite number of repetitions.
Example 4. This example is a continuation of Example 3 and it demonstrates how the edge
s3 → s1 in the 2-MIC-graph can be executed. Because s3 → s1, it is clear that l0 = s3 ∈ L and
l1 = s1 ∈ L¯. Since refugee 3 is unmatched at µ and speaks language l0 = s3, it follows that
i0 = 3. The execution of the chain s3 → s1 now proceeds as follows:
Iteration 1. Choose i1 = 1 because l(1) = l1 = s1, µ(1) = c1 and l0 = s3 ∈ A(c1).
Iteration 2. Choose cˆ = c3 because l1 = s1 ∈ A(c3).
21This follows from the construction of the n-MIC-graph. That is, refugee i0 exists because l0 ∈ L 6= ∅, the
agents specified in iterations 1, . . . ,m− 2 exist because lu−1 → lu for all u ∈ {1, . . . ,m− 2}, and landlord cˆ
exists because lm−1 ∈ L¯ 6= ∅.
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Hence, µ′(3) = µ′(i0) = µ(i1) = µ(1) = c1 and µ′(1) = µ′(i1) = cˆ = c3. Consequently,
matching µ′ is given by:
µ′ =
(
c1 c2 c3 c4
3 2 1 c4
)
.
Note that µ′(I2) = µ(I2) ∪ {3} and that the matching µ′ is a stable maximum matching for
problemR2. The latter conclusion follows from Proposition 2 because L∞ = ∅ and L¯ = {s2, s5}
at matching µ′ and, consequently, L∞ ∩ L¯ = ∅. Hence, µ2 = µ′. 
The stable maximum matching µn for problemRn will also be denoted by µ≥n. Once this match-
ing has been identified, the MIC-algorithm continues with iteration 0 where a stable maximum
matching µ≥n−1 for problem R≥n−1 is identified. As is clear from the description of the algo-
rithm, this iteration contains two separate steps, called Steps (i) and (ii). Because these separate
steps can be repeated for any iteration k = 0, . . . , n− 2, the following two subsections describe
these steps in their generic form, i.e., for an arbitrary iteration k = 0, . . . , n− 2.
4.2 ProblemRn−k−1: Generic Step (i) of the MIC-algorithm
Problem Rn−k−1 is generically almost identical to problem Rn. The essential difference is that
the former problem does not only contain landlords with capacity n − k − 1 but also all land-
lords who remained unmatched after the preceding iterations of the MIC-algorithm (if such land-
lords exist). More precisely, let the matching identified in the proceeding iteration of the MIC-
algorithm be denoted by µ≥n−k. Then problem Rn−k−1 contains refugee families with n− k− 1
family members, landlords with capacity n− k− 1, all unmatched landlords at matching µ≥n−k,
and the preferences of these agents.
Given problem Rn−k−1 and matching µ≥n−k, the (n − k − 1)-MIC-graph can now be con-
structed in the same fashion as the n-MIC-graph but for the above sets of agents. Consequently,
the relevant chains of refugees can be identified and executed by using identical techniques as
for problem Rn. Recall also that Proposition 2 demonstrated that these techniques in fact always
generate a stable maximum matching for problemRn. This result holds also for problemRn−k−1
even if the result not is formally stated in this paper (the proof follows directly by changing some
notation in the proof of Proposition 2).
Example 5. Consider Examples 3 and 4, and note thatR≥2 = R2, µ′ = µ2 = µ≥2 andRn−k−1 =
R1. The latter follows since n = 2 and k = 0. Problem R1 is defined by I1 = {4, 5} and
C≥1 \ {µ≥2(C≥2)} = {c4, c5}. In this example, the 1-MIC-graph need not be constructed as
the only refugee in I1 which is acceptable for the landlords in C≥1 is refugee 5, i.e., refugee
5 is acceptable for both landlords c4 and c5. Consequently, the following matching is a stable
maximum matching for problem R1:
µ1 =
(
c4 c5
c4 5
)
. 
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After a stable maximum matching µn−k−1 for problem Rn−k−1 has been identified, the MIC-
algorithm continues to its generic Step (ii) for the given iteration k. This step is necessary be-
cause the already identified matchings µ≥n−k and µn−k−1 are obtained almost separate from each
other (even if there may be some overlap, i.e., a landlord may be included problems R≥n−k and
Rn−k−1). Hence, even if µ≥n−k and µn−k−1 are stable maximum matchings for their correspond-
ing problems, the union of these matchings need not be a stable maximum matching for the union
of their corresponding problems. This can also seen in the following example.
Example 6. Consider Examples 3–5 and matchings µ≥2 and µ1, and note that:
µ′′ = µ≥2 ∪ µ1 =
(
c1 c2 c3 c4 c5
3 2 1 c4 5
)
.
But µ′′ is not a stable maximum matching. This is clear because the following matching is stable
and its cardinality is strictly greater than the cardinality of matching µ′′:
µ∗ =
(
c1 c2 c3 c4 c5
3 4 1 2 5
)
. 
4.3 ProblemR≥n−k−1: Generic Step (ii) of the MIC-algorithm
The objective of Step (ii) in the MIC-algorithm is to find a stable maximum matching µ≥n−k−1
for problem R≥n−k−1. Because this problem is defined as the union of the problems R≥n−k and
Rn−k−1, it contains all agents that have been included in the previous iterations and steps of the
MIC-algorithm. Hence, problem R≥n−k−1 contains all refugees with at least n − k − 1 family
members, all landlords with at least capacity n− k − 1, and the preferences of these agents, i.e.,
the agents in the set I≥n−k−1 ∪ C≥n−k−1 and their preferences.
A stable maximum matching for problem µ≥n−k−1 is found by, again, constructing a specific
graph, called the (≥ n − k − 1)-MIC-graph, for the known matching µ = µ≥n−k ∪ µn−k−1,
and by executing the relevant chains. This graph needs to be constructed differently compared
to the corresponding graphs for problems Rn and Rn−k−1 because the rematching procedure (or,
equivalently, the execution of the relevant chains of refugees) differs since a rematched landlord
may be assigned a refugee with fewer family members than the initial match. This is not possible
in problems Rn andRn−k−1 because rematched landlords in these problems are, by construction,
always rematched to a refugee family with a weakly larger family size compared to the initial
match. For this reason, it is not only important to keep track of the languages spoken by the
refugees and landlords, it is also important to keep track of what is “demanded” and what can
be “supplied” of these languages in terms of capacity. Consider, for instance, matching µ′′ from
Example 5. At this matching, refugee family 4 and landlord c4 are unmatched. Because refugee
family 4 have one family member and speaks language s3, language s3 “demands” capacity 1.
Similarly, since landlord c4 speaks languages s2 and s5 and have the capacity to accommodate a
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refugee family of size 1 or size 2, languages s2 and s5 can “supply” capacity 1 and capacity 2,
respectively.
To keep track of what is demanded and what can be supplied of the languages in terms of
capacity, the language notation needs to be augmented. Let lt denote a language l ∈ L that de-
mands capacity t and/or supplies capacity t. Language lt is then said to be a capacity-augmented
language. The set of all capacity-augmented languages for problem R≥n−k−1 is denoted by:
La = {lt : l ∈ L and t ≥ n− k − 1}.
To construct the (≥ n−k−1)-MIC-graph, it will now be important to identify the set of capacity-
augmented languages of all unmatched refugees and the set of acceptable capacity-augmented
languages for all unmatched landlords, denoted by L and L¯, respectively. These sets are formally
defined as:
L = {lt : there exists iˆ ∈ I≥n−k−1\µ(I≥n−k−1) such that l(ˆi) = l and qiˆ = t},
L¯ = {lt : there exists cˆ ∈ C≥n−k−1\µ(C≥n−k−1) such that l ∈ A(cˆ) and qcˆ ≥ t}.
The (≥ n− k − 1)-MIC-graph can now be constructed as follows for the given matching µ.
Construction of the (≥ n− k − 1)-MIC-graph for matchingµ = µ≥n−k ∪ µn−k−1.
Let the set of nodes be given by the set of capacity-augmented languages La. The
edges are constructed as follows. Initialize L0 = L. For each iteration u := 0, 1, . . .:
Iteration u + 1. Given lˆtˆ ∈ ∪ur=0Lr and lt ∈ L\(∪ur=0Lr) there is a directed edge
from lˆtˆ to lt if lˆ ∈ ∪i∈µ(Itl ):qµ(i)≥tˆA(µ(i)). Define:
Lu+1 = {lt ∈ La\(∪ur=0Lr) : lˆtˆ → lt for some lˆtˆ ∈ ∪ur=0Lr}.
If Lu+1 ∩ L¯ 6= ∅ or Lu+1 = ∅, terminate the process. Otherwise, set u := u+ 1 and
continue. 
Note that the set ∪i∈µ(Itl ):qµ(i)≥tˆA(µ(i)) contains all languages that are acceptable for the land-
lords in C≥n−k−1 that are matched to a refugee with capacity t and speaking language l at match-
ing µ. A more general description of an edge in the (≥ n−k−1)-MIC-graph is a chain of length
m from L to L¯ such that lt00 ∈ L, ltjm−1 ∈ L¯, and ltuu ∈ Lu for all u = 1, . . . ,m− 1, i.e.:
lt00 → lt11 → · · · → ltm−1m−1 . (3)
Proposition 3. Let µ be a stable matching for problem R≥n−k−1 and L∞ = ∪∞u=0Lu. Then the
following are equivalent for the (≥ n− k − 1)-MIC-algorithm:
(a) µ is not a maximum matching for problem R≥n−k−1.
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(b) L∞ ∩ L¯ 6= ∅.
(c) There exists a chain lt00 → lt11 → · · · → ltm−1m−1 from L to L¯ such that lt00 ∈ L, ltm−1m−1 ∈ L¯,
and ltuu ∈ Lu for all u = 1, . . . ,m− 1.
Using an almost identical procedure as the one described for problem Rn, a chain of type (3) can
be executed as described next.
Execution of a chain of length m from L to L¯ for problem R≥n−k−1. Consider
a given stable matching µ = µ≥n−k ∪ µn−k−1, a given problem R≥n−k−1, and a
given chain of type (3) of length m from L to L¯ in the (≥ n− k− 1)-MIC-graph for
matching µ. Choose i0 ∈ I t0l0 \µ(I t0l0 ) such that l(i0) = l0. For each u := 1, . . . ,m−2:
Iteration u. Choose iu ∈ µ(I tulu ) such that l(iu) = lu, lu−1 ∈ A(µ(iu)), and qµ(iu) ≥
tu−1.
Iteration m − 1. Choose cˆ ∈ C≥n−k−1\µ(C≥n−k−1) such that lm−1 ∈ A(cˆ) and
qcˆ ≥ tm−1.
From matching µ, matching µ′ is obtained as follows: µ′(iu) = µ(iu+1) for all u =
0, . . . ,m− 2, µ′(im−1) = cˆ, and µ′(i) = µ(i) for all i ∈ I≥n−k−1\{i0, . . . , im−1}.
Note that any execution of a chain from L to L¯ strictly increases the cardinality of the ini-
tial matching while maintaining stability, and it does not leave any previously matched agent
unmatched. The latter conclusion is important since it implies that one need not return to prob-
lem R≥n−k. Moreover, the findings in this subsection can be used as follows. Construct the
(≥ n − k − 1)-MIC-graph for the given stable matching µ and check whether L∞ ∩ L¯ 6= ∅. If
L∞∩ L¯ = ∅, then matching µ is a stable maximum matching for problem Rn−k−1 by Proposition
3, and the algorithm can continue to iteration k + 1. Otherwise, there is a chain of type (3) and
this chain can be executed to obtain a new stable matching µ′ from the initial matching µ. Given
matching µ′, the procedure is repeated and after a finite number of iterations, stable maximum
matching µ≥n−k−1 for problem R≥n−k−1 is obtained. This is in fact also the proof of Theorem
3. Too see this, note that in the last step of the last iteration of the MIC-algorithm (i.e., Step (ii)
of iteration n − 2), all refugees and all landlords are included in problem R≥1 by construction.
Then because a stable maximum matching is identified for problem R≥1, it must also be a stable
maximum matching for the given refugee assignment problem.
Example 7. This example builds on Examples 3–6. Note first that I≥1 = I1 ∪ I2 = {1, 2, 3} ∪
{4, 5} = I and C≥1 = C1 ∪ C2 = {1, 2, 3, 4} ∪ {5} = C. Moreover, because 2 is the maximal
capacity of any agent in problem R≥1, it follows that La = L1 ∪ L2 where Lt = {st1, . . . , st5}
for t = 1, 2. Recall now from Example 6 that only landlord c4 and refugee 4 are unmatched at
µ′′ = µ≥2 ∪ µ1. Because refugee 4 only speaks language s4 and only has one family member, it
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follows L = {s14}. Furthermore, landlord c4 speaks both languages s2 and s5 and has the capacity
to accommodate refugee families of size 1 and 2. Hence, L¯ = {s12, s22, s15, s25}.
Start by constructing an edge in the (≥ 1)-MIC-graph for matching µ′′. Set L0 = L = {s14}
and, consequently, s22 ∈ La\L0 = La\{s14}. The construction of an edge in the (≥ 1)-MIC-graph
for matching µ′′ now proceeds as follows:
Iteration 1. Consider the given language l′ = s14 ∈ L0, and note that there is a
directed edge from l′ = s14 ∈ L0 to l = s22 ∈ La \ L0, i.e., s14 → s22. This follows
because language s4 is acceptable to landlord c2, landlord c2 is matched to refugee 2
at matching µ′′, and refugee 2 has capacity 2 and speaks language s2. Consequently,
L1 = {s22}.
Because s22 ∈ L¯, it follows that L1 ∩ L¯ = {s22} 6= ∅ and the process terminates. Execute next
the identified chain s14 → s22. Note first that l0 = s14 ∈ L and l1 = s22 ∈ L¯. Since refugee 4 is
unmatched at µ′′ and speaks language l0 = s4, it follows that i0 = 4. Furthermore:
Iteration 1. Choose i1 = 2 because l(2) = s2 and q2 = 2, µ′′(2) = c2, and l0 = s4 ∈
A(c2).
Iteration 2. Choose cˆ = c4 because l1 = s2 ∈ A(c4) and q2 ≤ qc4 .
Now, matching µ′′′ is given by:
µ′′′(4) = µ′′′(i0) = µ′′(i1) = µ′′(2) = c2,
µ′′′(2) = µ′′′(i1) = cˆ = c4,
µ′′′(j) = µ′′(j) for j ∈ {1, 3, 5}.
Hence:
µ′′′ = µ∗ = µ≥1 =
(
c1 c2 c3 c4 c5
3 4 1 2 5
)
.
That matching µ≥1 is a stable maximum matching for the considered refugee assignment problem
follows from Proposition 3 since L¯ = ∅ at matching µ≥1. 
Remark 1. A stable maximum matching can be identified in polynomial time for any refugee
assignment problem. To see this, note that in each iteration of the MIC-algorithm, (a) a stable
matching needs to be identified, (b) edges in the MIC-graph needs to be constructed, and (c)
chains need to be executed. Part (a) can be achieved in polynomial time using the Deferred
Acceptance Algorithm (Gale and Shapley, 1962). Part (b) can also be achieved in polynomial
time because at most 2n+ |C| edges must be identified in total and each edge can be identified in
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polynomial time using methods introduced by Ford and Fulkerson (1956). Finally, we note that
the relevant chains in part (c) are implicitly identified in (b).
To see that at most 2n + |C| edges must be identified in total, note that an edge in the MIC-
graph is constructed either to (b.1) verify that a matching is a stable maximum matching or to
(b.2) execute a chain from L to L¯ to increase the cardinality of the matching. A verification
of type (b.1) is needed for Steps (i) and (ii) in each iteration k, i.e., in total 2n times since the
MIC-algorithm contains exactly n iterations (including the initialization step). An execution of
type (b.2) can take place at most |C| times. This follows because only chains of type (ii) from
Theorem 2 are executed, since exactly one unmatched landlord becomes matched after each
execution, and because a stable maximum matching is obtained if all landlords are matched to
some refugee family (i.e., if L¯ = ∅). 
Remark 2. Finally, we remark that if the matching of the MIC-algorithm is not (Pareto) effi-
cient, then the matching µ≥1 can be used as endowments for the landlords and the Top Trading
Cycles Algorithm (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) can be applied in a setting where landlords ex-
change refugee families of equal size. Then, the cardinality of the matching can never decrease
and the resulting matching is stable because any landlord only points to refugees speaking one
of its acceptable languages. 
5 Strategy-Proofness
When designing matching mechanisms, it is always a concern that agents may be able manipulate
the outcome of the mechanism in their advantage (see, e.g., Abdulkadirog˘lu and Sönmez, 2003;
Abdulkadirog˘lu et al., 2009; Balinski and Sönmez, 1999; Dubins and Freedman, 1981; Roth,
1982; Roth et al., 2004). Unfortunately, it is known that there exists no matching mechanism
on two-sided matching markets that produces an outcome which is stable and at the same time
give the agents on both sides of the market incentives to truthfully report their preferences (Roth,
1982). As can be expected from this result, most of the results related manipulability presented
in this section are negative. Note also that refugee families only report their family size and the
language they speak and it is not very unrealistic to believe that both these variables are difficult to
misrepresent as they easily can be verified. However, landlords have some degree of freedom as
they can rank languages they speak (refugees can also be allowed to report multiple languages,
see Appendix A) and it is therefore important to investigate strategic properties related to the
refugee assignment problem.
A matching mechanism is, in this section, described as a function f : PV → M choosing
a feasible matching for any profile R ∈ PV . Let also fv(R) denote the match for agent v at
matching f(R). The mechanism f is a maximum matching mechanism if f(R) is a maximum
matching for any profile R ∈ PV , and the mechanism f is a stable matching mechanism if
f(R) is a stable matching for any R ∈ PV . A matching mechanism is strategy-proof if no
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agent can gain by misrepresenting their true preferences (say by reporting Rv′ instead of the
true preferences Rv) at any profile given the reports of the other agents. Formally, matching
mechanism f is strategy-proof if for all R ∈ PV and all v ∈ V , there exists no (R′v, R−v) ∈ PV
such that fv(R′v, R−v)Pvfv(R). Here, the profile resulting from unilateral deviation by agent v
must still belong to the set of our problems (in the sense that c may misreport its ranking over
languages and i may misreport its spoken language).22
Proposition 4. There is no maximum matching mechanism which is strategy-proof for the land-
lords.
Because any stable maximum matching mechanism is a maximum matching mechanism, Propo-
sition 4 implies that there does not exist any stable maximum matching mechanism which is
strategy-proof for the landlords in the refugee assignment problem. While this may not be en-
tirely surprising, it is next demonstrated that there exist a stable mechanism which is strategy-
proof for the landlords but no stable mechanism which is strategy-proof for both landlords and
refugees. The mechanism which is strategy-proof for the landlords always selects a C-optimal
matching. Here, a matching µ is C-optimal if it is stable and there exists no other stable match-
ing µ′ such that µ′(c)Rcµ(c) for all c ∈ C and µ′(c)Pcµ(c) for some c ∈ C. To demonstrate
these results let, without loss of generality, qc1 ≥ qc2 ≥ · · · ≥ qc|C| , and let t stand for break-
ing ties according to the natural order >t, i.e., c1 >t c2 >t · · · >t c|C| for C = {c1, . . . , c|C|}
and i1 >t i2 >t · · · >t i|I| for I = {i1, . . . , i|I|}. Let DAt(R) denote the landlord-proposing
Deferred Acceptance Algorithm where, for any profile R, ties are broken according to t.
Theorem 4. Let R ∈ PV . Then:
(a) DAt(R) always produces a C-optimal matching.
(b) DAt(R) is strategy-proof for C.
(c) No stable mechanism is strategy-proof for both landlords and refugees.
Note also that the last part of the theorem is related to the corresponding strategy-proofness
result for the marriage market (Gale and Shapley, 1962) where it is known that a mechanism that
selects the male-optimal (female-optimal) stable matching is generally strategy-proof for the
males (females) but not for the females (males). See, e.g., Roth (1982) or Dubins and Freedman
(1981).
22This paper does not consider the possibility for groups of agents to manipulate the mechanism. See Barberà et
al. (2016) for the a recent paper on the relation between individual manipulability and group manipulability.
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6 Concluding Remarks
This paper is one of the first to investigate a matching model related to refugee resettlement and
refugee assignment. In fact, we are only aware of a few other matching contributions investigat-
ing this specific problem which have been cited in the Introduction.
The point of departure has been the European refugee crisis during 2015–2016 and, more
specifically, the acute problem to find housing for refugees in Sweden. Even if the presented
matching model is stylized, in the sense that landlords and refugees only are allowed to submit
limited information related to ability to communicate (i.e., language) and capacity (i.e., num-
ber of beds available/needed), the model is still relevant from a policy perspective because the
MIC-algorithm is easy-to-implement and it can be adopted as is without any modifications. The
MIC-algorithm can therefore be seen as a first emergency measure to release pressure on the
municipalities in their attempts to find additional residential units. Even if it has not been dis-
cussed in the paper, one can also imagine that preferences are induced based on other criteria than
communication (e.g., geographical preferences) or a combination of several variables (see, e.g.,
Delacretaz et al., 2016). Hence, this paper should be seen as a first step to solve an acute problem
but future research is needed to find alternative proposals. It is, however, clear that the investi-
gated problem is on the highest political agenda in all member states of the European Union and
it is therefore crucial that the market design community continues to investigate problems related
to refugee matching and refugee resettlement.
The paper has also contributed to the matching and market design literature in a broader sense
since it has provided a new type of matching mechanism for two-sided matching markets. This
mechanism is not limited to the refugee assignment problem and the techniques developed in the
paper can be applied to any problem where agents rank indifference classes of agents rather than
individual agents and where stable maximum matchings are of importance.
Finally, the key in the method to identify a stable maximum matching, considered in this
paper, is the construction of the edges in the MIC-graph. A possible alternative method is to
consider a bipartite graph whose vertices are given by the disjoint sets C and I , and where an
edge connects landlord c ∈ C and refugee i ∈ I if and only if landlord c is acceptable to
refugee i and refugee i is acceptable to landlord c. By assigning specific edge weights, based on
preferences over languages and family size, a stable maximum matching may then be identified
in polynomial time by adopting the Hungarian method of Kuhn (1955) and Munkres (1957). The
appropriate construction of such problem and an investigation of the properties of the solution to
the problem is left for future research.
Appendix A: Multiple Languages for Refugees
Suppose now that refugees are allowed to speak multiple languages. This case can be covered
by the framework investigated in this paper as explained in this Appendix.
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Suppose now that each refugee i ∈ I is allowed to speak a subset of languages L(i) ⊆ L.
This translates to the “best” language for any landlord c in the following way. Let lc(i) =
maxc L(i) ∪ {∅} be the most preferred spoken language of refugee i from the perspective of
landlord c. Then refugee i is acceptable for landlord c if and only if lc(i) ∈ A(c) and qi ≤ qc.
Now, when defining the preferenceRc of landlord c, language l(i) is simply replaced by language
lc(i).
Similarly, the preferences Ri of refugee i is derived as follows: (a) cPii ⇔ lc(i) ∈ A(c)
and qi ≤ qc and (b) cIic′ ⇔ lc(i) ∈ A(c) and qi ≤ qc, and lc′(i) ∈ A(c′) and qi ≤ qc′ . Note
here that (b) means that a refugee is indifferent between any acceptable landlords that have the
“best” language in common with the refugee.
LetR = (Rv)v∈V denote the derived profile. Then it is easy to check that all results presented
in this paper holds also for this profile.
Appendix B: Proofs
For some of the coming results, it will be necessary to introduce the notion of tie-breaking. For
this purpose, letRV denote the set of all profiles including those which do not necessarily respect
language constraints. A profile R ∈ RV is strict if Rv is strict for all v ∈ V . Consider now the
profiles Rt, R ∈ RV and the matching µ. A profile Rt breaks ties in R if and only if (i) for
all landlords c ∈ C and all distinct agents v, v′ ∈ I ∪ {c}, vPcv′ implies vP tcv′, and (ii) for all
refugees i ∈ I and all distinct agents v, v′ ∈ C ∪ {i}, vPiv′ implies vP ti v′. A profile Rt breaks
ties in R in favor of µ if and only if (i) Rt breaks ties in R, (ii) for any landlord c ∈ C and agent
v ∈ I ∪ {c} with v 6= µ(c), µ(c)Rcv implies µ(c)P tcv, and (iii) for any landlord i ∈ C and agent
v ∈ C ∪ {i} with v 6= µ(i), µ(i)Riv implies µ(i)P ti v. The first result in this Appendix relates
the notions of stability and tie-breaking.
Lemma 1. Let µ be a matching and R ∈ RV . Then matching µ is stable at profile R if and only
if there exists a strict profile Rt ∈ RV that breaks ties in R such that µ is stable under Rt.
Proof. Suppose that the matching µ is stable at profile R ∈ RV , and let Rt be a strict profile that
breaks ties in R in favor of µ. Then, the matching µ is stable at profile Rt by construction.
In showing the converse, letRt be a strict profile that breaks ties inR. Suppose that µ is stable
under Rt. Then µ is feasible under R. Furthermore, if for some (c, i) we have both iPcµ(c) and
cPiµ(i), then we have both iP tcµ(c) and cP
t
i µ(i) since R
t breaks ties in R, contradicting stability
of matching µ at profile Rt.
Proof of Theorem 1. Let µ be a maximum matching and let Rt be a strict profile breaking ties in
R in favor of µ. If µ is stable under Rt, then by Lemma 1, µ is a stable maximum matching and
the proof is completed. Otherwise, there exists a blocking pair (c, i) for matching µ and profile
Rt. Note now that it cannot be the case that µ(i) = i and µ(c) = c, because then µ cannot be a
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maximum matching. Moreover, it cannot be the case that µ(i) 6= i and µ(c) = c since refugee i
then cannot strictly gain from blocking by construction of the preferences. Hence, it must be the
case that µ(c) 6= c. Since (c, i) is a blocking pair, it now follows that either:
– qµ(c) < qi ≤ qc and l(i) ∈ A(c), or;
– qµ(c) = qi ≤ qc and l(i) c l(µ(c)).
Consider now matching µ′ where µ′(c) = i, µ′(µ(c)) = µ(c), and µ′(v) = µ(v) for all v ∈
V \ {c, i, µ(c)}. Then |µ′| ≥ |µ| and µ′ is a maximum matching. Let R′t be a strict profile
breaking ties in R in favor of µ′. If µ′ is stable under R′t, then the proof is again completed by
Lemma 1. Otherwise we continue as above and improve the landlords’ rankings and, at some
point, a stable maximum matching must be found. 
Proof of Theorem 2. Let µ be a stable matching for profile R, and let Rk be a strict profile that
breaks ties in R in favor of µ. Consequently, µ is a stable matching also for the strict profile
Rk. Suppose now that µ is not a maximum matching. Then there exists a feasible matching
µ′ such that |µ′| > |µ|. Without loss of generality, the matching µ′ may be chosen such that
the number |{v ∈ V : µ(v) 6= µ′(v)}| is minimal among all feasible matchings having strictly
greater cardinality than µ.
Note first that there exists a refugee i ∈ I such that µ(i) = i and µ′(i) 6= i. This follows
because if µ(i) = i implies µ′(i) = i for all unmatched refugees at matching µ, then |µ′| ≤ |µ|
which contradicts the assumption that |µ′| > |µ|. Suppose now that µ(i) = i and µ′(i) = c for
some refugee i ∈ I and some landlord c ∈ C. Then, by feasibility of matching µ′, it follows
that l(i) c c and qi ≤ qc. Because matching µ is stable at profile Rk, it must be the case that
µ(c)P kc i. It will next be demonstrated that also µ(c)Pci.
To see that also µ(c)Pci, note first that, by stability of matching µ, the case iPcµ(c) can
be excluded. Suppose instead that µ(c)Ici and let µ(c) = j. This also means that qj = qi
and l(i) = l(j). But then instead of considering matching µ′, we may ignore refugee j and
consider the matching µ′′ where µ′′(i) = µ′(j) and µ′′(i′) = µ′(i′) for all i′ ∈ I \ {j}. Then
|µ′′| = |µ′| > |µ| but |{v ∈ V : µ(v) 6= µ′′(v)}| < |{v ∈ V : µ(v) 6= µ′(v)}|, which contradicts
the choice of matching µ′. Thus, it must be the case that jPci or, equivalently, that µ(c)Pci. This
also means that either qj > qi, or qj = qi and l(j) c l(i).
Because µ(i) = i, µ′(i) = c, µ(c) = j, there exists a sequence of refugees 〈i0, . . . , im〉 such
that µ(i0) = i0 and µ(in) = cn for all n = 1, . . . ,m, where µ′(in) = µ(in+1) = cn+1 for all n =
0, 1, . . . ,m− 1 and either (a) µ′(im) = im or (b) µ′(im) = cm+1 and µ(cm+1) = cm+1. Note also
that in−1Pcncn for all n = 0, 1, . . . ,m since matching µ′ is feasible. By the choice of matching
µ′, we may, without loss of generality, assume that the sequence 〈i0, . . . , im〉 is both unique and
shortest. But then cn′Pcn′ in for all n = 0, . . . ,m−2 and all n′ = n+2, . . . ,m, because otherwise
refugee in may be assigned to landlord cn′ to obtain a shorter sequence 〈i0, . . . , in, in′ , . . . , im〉.
Cases (a) and (b) are next considered separately.
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Case (a) will prove Part (i) of the theorem. That qim < qi0 follows directly since µ
′(im) = im
and |µ′| > |µ|. To see that also qi0 ≤ qin for all n = 1, . . . ,m − 1, suppose that qin < qi0
for some n. But then it is possible to choose a shorter sequence of refugees 〈i0, . . . , in〉 leaving
refugee in unmatched and at the same time increase the cardinality of matching µ. It then follows
that l(i0) /∈ A(cn) for all n = 2, . . . ,m, otherwise it is again possible to consider a shorter
sequence of refugees 〈i0, in, in+1, . . . , im〉 and obtain a matching with strictly greater cardinality,
which is a contradiction. Hence, cn′Pcn′ i0 for all n
′ = 2, . . . ,m. Similarly, refugee i1 cannot
be matched to any of the landlords c3, c4, . . . , cm because if this is the case, it is again possible
to consider a shorter sequence. Thus, l(i1) /∈ A(cn) or qi1 > qcn for all n = 3, . . . ,m. By
repeating the arguments for the remaining refugees in the chain, it follows that cn′Pcn′ in for all
n = 0, . . . ,m− 2 and all n′ = n+ 2, . . . ,m.
Case (b) will prove Part (ii) of the theorem. Note first that because µ′ is a feasible matching,
µ′(im) = cm+1 and µ(cm+1) = cm+1, it follows that imPcm+1cm+1 and cm+1 ∈ C\µ(C). Simi-
larly as above, because there is no shorter sequence of refugees than 〈i0, . . . im〉, it must hold that
cn′Pcn′ in for all n = 0, 1, . . . ,m− 2 and all n′ = n+ 2, . . . ,m. 
Proof of Proposition 2. (a)⇔(c). It is only shown that (a) implies (c) since the proof that (c)
implies (a) is analogous. If µ is not a stable maximum matching, then by Theorem 2, there exists
a shortest chain of refugees 〈i0, i1, . . . , ij〉 such that µ(i0) = i0, µ(iu) = cu and iu−1Pcucu for
all u = 1, . . . , j, and either part (i) or part (ii) of the theorem holds. Because all refugees have
capacity n, it cannot be the case that qi0 < qij and, consequently, part (i) of the theorem cannot
hold. Suppose instead that part (ii) holds and consider the n-MIC-graph for matching µ and a
shortest chain 〈i0, i1, . . . , ij〉. Then, by construction of the (shortest) chain, l(i0) ∈ L = L0,
l(i0) → l(i1), l(i1) ∈ L1, l(iu) → l(iu+1) for all u = 1, . . . , j − 1, and l(ij) ∈ L¯. Because
〈i0, i1, . . . , ij〉 is a shortest chain, it is clear that l(i1) ∈ L \ L0 and l(iu+1) ∈ L \ ∪ur=0Lr for all
u = 1, . . . , j − 1. But then lu ≡ l(iu) ∈ Lu for all u = 1, . . . , j − 1 by definition of the set Lu.
Hence, (a) implies (c).
(c)⇔(b). This equivalence follows immediately from the construction of the n-MIC-graph
for matching µ. 
Proof of Proposition 3. The proof is analogous to the proof of Proposition 3. (a)⇔(c). Again, it
is only demonstrated that (a) implies (c) since the proof that (c) implies (a) is analogous. If µ is
not a stable maximum matching, then by Theorem 2, there exists a shortest chain 〈i0, i1, . . . , ij〉
such that µ(i0) = i0, µ(iu) = cu and iu−1Pcucu for all u = 1, . . . , j, and either part (i) or part
(ii) of the theorem holds. Suppose first that part (i) holds, i.e., that qij < qi0 ≤ qiu for all
u = 1, . . . , j − 1. If qij ≥ n − k, then matching µ≥n−k cannot be a maximum matching since
the chain 〈i0, i1, . . . , ij〉 then is present also at problem R≥n−k. Thus, qij = n− k − 1. But then
qiu ≥ qi0 ≥ n− k for all u = 1, . . . , j − 1, and it, again, follows that matching µ≥n−k cannot be
maximum for problem R≥n−k. Thus, only part (ii) of the theorem can occur. Because µ≥n−k is a
27
maximum matching for problem R≥n−k, it must be the case that qi0 = n−k− 1 and qiu ≥ n−k
for some u = 1, . . . , j.
Consider now the (≥ n−k−1)-MIC-graph for matching µ and a shortest chain 〈i0, i1, . . . , ij〉.
Then, by construction of the chain, l(i0)qi0 ∈ L = L0, l(i0)qi0 → l(i1)qi1 , l(i1)qi1 ∈ L1,
l(iu)
qiu → l(iu+1)qiu+1 for all u = 1, . . . , j − 1, and l(ij)qij ∈ L¯. Because 〈i0, i1, . . . , ij〉
is a shortest chain, it is clear that l(i1)qi1 ∈ La \ L0 and l(iu+1)qiu+1 ∈ La \ ∪ur=0Lr for all
u = 1, . . . , j − 1. But then, by setting tu = qiu for all u = 1, . . . , j − 1, it follows that
ltu ≡ l(iu)tu ∈ Lu for all u = 1, . . . , j − 1 by definition of the set Lu. Hence, (a) implies (c).
(c)⇔(b). This equivalence is immediate from the construction of the (≥ n − k − 1)-MIC-
graph for matching µ. 
Proof of Proposition 4. Let C = {c1, c2, c3}, I = {1, 2, 3} and qv = 1 for all v ∈ V , L =
{s1, s2, s3}, and l(i) = si for all i ∈ I . The strict preferences over acceptable languages for the
landlords are given by s1 c1 s3 c1 c1, s2 c2 s3 c2 c2, and s2 c3 s1 c3 c3. The induced
preference profile R is then given by:
Rc1 Rc2 Rc3 R1 R2 R3
1 2 2 c1, c3 c2, c3 c1, c2
3 3 1
Then matchings µ and µ′ are the only maximum matchings at profile R where:
µ =
(
c1 c2 c3
1 3 2
)
, µ′ =
(
c1 c2 c3
3 2 1
)
.
Because f(R) is a maximum matching, it must be the case that fc1(R) = 3 or fc2(R) = 3. These
cases are next considered separately.
Suppose first that fc1(R) = 3. In this case, landlord c1 can manipulate by misrepresenting
preferences over acceptable languages ′c1 such that s1 ′c1 c1. In this case, µ is the unique
maximum matching for profile (R′c1 , R−c1) and, consequently, f(R
′
c1
, R−c1) = µ. But then
fc1(R
′
c1
, R−c1)Pc1fc1(R), which means that landlord c1 has a profitable deviation from R.
Suppose next that fc2(R) = 3. In this case, landlord c2 can manipulate by misrepresent-
ing preferences over acceptable languages ′c2 such that s2 ′c2 c2. In this case, µ′ is the
unique maximum matching for (R′c2 , R−c2) and, consequently, f(R
′
c2
, R−c2) = µ
′. But then
fc2(R
′
c2
, R−c2)Pc2fc2(R), which means that landlord c2 has a profitable deviation from R. 
Proof of Theorem 4. To show part (a), suppose that matching µ is selected by DAt(R) but
that matching µ not is a C-optimal matching. Then there exists a stable matching µ′ such that
µ′(c)Rcµ(c) for all c ∈ C with µ′(cˆ)Pcˆµ(cˆ) for some landlord cˆ. By stability of matching µ,
there is no refugee i ∈ I such that µ(i) = i, µ′(i) 6= i and iPµ′(i)µ(µ′(i)). Thus, if µ(i) = i
and µ′(i) 6= i, then iIµ′(i)µ(µ′(i)). But then, for µ(µ′(i)) = j, we may suppose, without loss
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of generality, that µ(i) = µ′(i) and µ(j) = j as this does not change the welfare of µ′(i)
and does not alter stability. But now matching µ must admit a stable improvement cycle à la
Erdil and Ergin (2008), say 〈c1, . . . , cm〉, i.e, µ(ck+1)Pckµ(ck) for all k. Because each refugee
speaks exactly one language, ties are broken according to >t and each landlord ck applies to
µ(ck+1) before applying to µ(ck), this implies that ck+1 >t ck for all k, and c1 >t cm. But then
cm >t cm−1 >t · · · >t c1 >t cm, which is a contradiction to the fact that the same ordering >t is
used to break ties in refugees preferences.
Part (b) of the theorem follows directly because the Deferred Acceptance algorithm is strategy-
proof for C on the strict domain and landlords break ties in favor of larger capacities. Hence, it
is clear that DAt(R) is strategy-proof for C for all profiles R ∈ PV .
To prove part (c), suppose that C = {c1}, I = {1, 2}, qv = 1 for all v, and L = {s1, s2, s3}.
Let the strict preferences over acceptable languagesc1 for landlord c1 be given by s1 c1 s2 c1
s3 c1 c1. Suppose further that refugees 1 and 2 speaks languages s2 and s3, respectively. Then
by stability, refugee 1 is assigned to landlord c1 and refugee 2 remains unmatched. But if refugee
2 changes his language from s3 to s1, then refugee 2 is assigned to landlord c1. Hence, even if the
stable mechanism is strategy-proof for the landlords, it can be manipulated by the refugees. 
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